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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Case No. 
10761 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal to this Court from orders of the 
l'ublic St>rvice Commission of Utah, herein referred to 
as the "Commission," in its Case 3918, Sub 12, wherein 
it first denied the application of W. S. Hatch Company, 
liPrein r<"ferred to as "Hatch," on July 12, 1966, and 
thf·n on rc~hearing reversed itself on August 25, 1966 
nml issued a certificate to transport sulphuric acid in 
l1nlk from J\1Pxiean Hat to Moab, Utah. 
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DISPOSITION OF MATTER BY COl\Il\IISSION 
Plaintiff herein, Prichard Transfer, Inc., herein re-
ferred to as "Prichard," protestPd thl' application of 
Hatch, as Prichard held proppr common carrier author-
ity from tlw Commission to transport sulphuric acid 
in bulk from Mexican Hat to .l\1oab, Utah, and \\'as 
actively performing the very sPrvice which Hatch 
sought. After the first hearing on April l, 19GG, it:-; 
Order was issued July 12, 1%G, denying the Hatch appli-
cation and finding that P1·ichard has the authority, the 
c·quiprnent necessary and that "the evidence indicate:;; 
that the services of Prichard in the transportation of 
sulphuric acid am good." The Hatch Petition for Re-
hearing was granted and, without taking further evi-
dence, the Commission entered its Order August 2;), 
1966, reversing its prior Order of denial, and granted 
to Hatch a Certificate to rwrforrn tlH' sanw sulphuric 
acid haul then being performed by Prichard from M:t>xi-
ean Hat to Moab. Prichard's Petition for Rehearing wa:-; 
filed timely (September 13, 19nG), hut said petition was 
denied October 10, 19G6. 11 he Petition for \Vrit of Re-
view was filed in this court on Oetoher 28, l9G6. 
RELlEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL 
Prichard seeks to have this eourt reverse the Com-
mission and find that the last Order in this proceeding-, 
wherein its prior Order was rt'VPl'SP<l and wlwrPin a ('pr-
3 
tifirate was granted to Hatrh, is arbitrary and capri-
('ious, is not supported by the evidence and is contrary 
to law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A sulphuric acid mill is operated at Mexican Hat, 
Ftah, (San Juan County). Part of the acid is required at 
the uranium mill in _Moab (Grand County). Prichard 
holds authority from the Commission (Exhibit 5, R. 104) 
to transport "acid in bulk in tank trucks" between Grand 
and San J nan Counties, plus other countit>s not here 
1wrtinent. 
For the past two years it has been hauling acid 
from the Mexican Hat plant to the uranium plant at 
.'.\foab and to otht>r points. 
Prichard has four acid tankers, (R. 106) over 25 
diesc~l tractors (R. 105) and other equipment. It sta-
tions its equipment for this acid haul at its tenninal in 
1\loab and maintains its office and shop at Price, Utah. 
This carrier has had many years of service experience 
in hauling acids and other commodities. It has served 
the uranium mills since their inception. :Mr. Rex L . 
. lones of Atlas :Minerals, a division of Atlas Corporation, 
tliP shipper of the acid, testified that it had used Prich-
anl for hauling its acid to the Moab mill from its Mexican 
I lat acid plant and had found the service to be "very 
:-;at is fartory." 
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Hatch has been hauling molten sulphur from the 
railhead near Potash, Utah (18 milc>s from l\f oab) to 
Mexican Hat. This is an interstate commerce move-
ment, as the> sulphur originates by rail in Canada. Thus 
the shipper uses Hatch as an interstate earrier to haul 
the sulphur to its acid plant at l\lexican Hat and uses 
Prichard to haul the acid to back to Moab for its uranium 
mill. The shipper expects to increase its volume of ship-
ments and expressed its opinion that it could obtain 
a better rate from Hatch if it could not only haul the 
sulphur to Mt>xiran Hat but also bring back the acid. 
The evidence shows that the shipper estimated 1,000 
tons of sulphur southbound and 1,500 tons of acid north-
bound. Upon these figures it t>stimated that Hatch could 
publish lower rates on both commodities and save shipper 
the difference between $159,720.00 per year at the present 
rates and $91 ,200.00, to-wit $68,500.00 ( R. 43). 
Hatch presented evidence that it would place m 
service a different type tanker trailer unit which 1s 
capable of hauling the molten sulphur south and the 
acid north. Prichard testified that it would also pro-
cure such type equipment if required. As the ratio of 
sulphur movements to acid movements is two to three, 
one-third of all trips southbound must be empty, even 
if the authority is granted (R +:~--t--t-). 
Both carriers are experienced and capable of trans-
}JOrting the sulphuric acid. Prichard has the acid equip-
ment and intrastate authoritv and is performinO' the . b 
service. Hatch holds I.C.C. sulphur authority and is 
hauling sulphur. Prichard does not have LC.C. sulphur 
rights and Hatch does not have P.S.C.U. acid rights 
from Mexican Hat to Moab. Each, in its own scope of 
authority, is performing satisfactory service for the 
shipper. 
At the initial hearing in April 1966 the Commission 
found that Prichard performs the acid service, stations 
acid hauling equipment at Moab ''and evidence indicates 
that the services of Prichard in the transportation of 
sulphuric are good." (R. 108) Then it referred to the 
desire of Atlas for reduction in transportation costs. 
'•'rhis position has merit strictly on an economic and 
rate basis, but does not constitute a showing of con-
venience and necessity or need for a new carrier." (R. 
109) It then suggested that "Hatch and Prichard should 
work together to reduce operating costs and thereby 
iirovide for a reduction in rates on both the movement 
of molten sulphur, Potash to 1\fexican Hat, and the move-
ment of sulphuric acid, l\fexican Hat to Moab." There-
upon it denied the application of Hatch and ordered the 
two carriers to "make and employ every legal means 
of reducing operating costs and correspondingly reduce 
thP rates" on the molten sulphur and the sulphuric acid. 
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A Petition for Rehearing was filed by Hatch (R. 
1l2) and then the Commission set the matter for oral 
argument on said petition (R. 114). Snch was done on 
August 16th. No new evidence \Vas tendered or received. 
On August 25 a new Report and Order was issued (R. 
116-120) which vacated the earlier one and granted Hatch 
an intrastate certificate to haul acid from :Mexican Hat 
to Moeab. Once again it found that " ... Prichard pro-
vided satsifactory transportation on the north bound 
movem0nt of sulphuric arid .... " (R. 118-119) and con-
tinued: 
"vVe stated in our original order that the 
case is more than in the nature of a rate case 
than a certificate case and that while tlw showing-
made by applicant \Vas meritorious it did not 
constitute a showing of convenience and nece8sity. 
As a general proposition we think this statement 
is correct. However, the farts presented here 
present a unique case in \vhich we think consid-
eration of rates and the Pconomies proposPd is 
proper. After hearing argument by both appli-
cant and protestant on applicant's petition for 
rehearing and reconsideration, and after hearing 
additional evidence adduced by both parties, WP 
find that applicant has sustained its burden of 
proving convenience and necessit~r in this particu-
lar instance, and that a grant of the application 
will afford the shipper a eornhination transporta-
tion service at ratf's to whieh it is t~ntitl<>d." (R 
118-119) 
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Prichard then filed its Petition for Rehearing (R. 
122-123), but such was denied bv Order on October 10 . ' 
1966 ( R. 124), and thereafter this appeal was taken. 
Prichard's evidence demonstrates that the diversion 
of this sulphuric acid haul vrill require it to close down 
its l\J oab terminal and will adversely affect its opera. 
tions. 
Applicant testified that it would duplicate Prich-
ard's operations, as it would station equipment at Moab 
(R. 17), where Prichard has its tank equipment sta-
tioned. Hatch says its present operations are not effi-
cient on hauling molten sulphur, as it is a one-day haul 
and they are using a converted insulated asphalt type 
semi-trailer. A new unit would be required for it to 
perform the two-way haul of sulphur and of acid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FACTS PROVE ADEQUATE AND SATISFAC-
TORY SERVICE BY PRICHARD ON ALL ACID 
MOVEMENTS AND ITS ABILITY TO CONTINUE 
PERFORMANCE FOR SHIPPER. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN BASING AN INTRA-
STATE CERTIFICATE GRANT ON POSSIBLE BUT 
UNPROVEN RATE SAVINGS ON A COMBINATION 
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE MOVEMENT. 
8 
POINT III 
MERE PROSPECTIVE SA VIN GS FROM JOINT 
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE RATE REDUC-
TIONS PROPOSED BY APPLICANT ARE NOT 
PROPER BASES FOR GRANT OF AUTHORITY 
WHERE NO INADEQUACY OF EXISTING AUTHOR-
IZED SERVICE HAS BEEN SHOWN. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION 
THAT THE PROSPECTIVE REDUCTION OF IN-
TERSTATE AND INTRASTATE RATES IS A BASIS 
FOR PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY 
UNDER THE UT AH STATUTE. 
The requisite procedural steps for this appeal have 
been taken and there is a clear issue before this court 
which boils down to this proposition: 
In the face of existing satisfactory service 
by Prichard on the intrastate acid haul, may the 
Commission grant authority to Hatch to perform 
that very service solely to enable shipper to ob-
tain lower rates on a combination interstate and 
intrastate movement (interstate molten sulphur 
southbound and intrastate sulphuric acid north-
bound)~ 
9 
The answer to this prnlil<·rn is furOwr complicated 
11,· tliP aprilicant's faihHP to Ill'<'s<>nt to th<> Commission 
any Pxhihits n•flpdinp: its suppmwd iww and lower rnt<•s 
<;Jl PithPr thP infrrstatP or tlw intrastatP S<'µ,'lll<'nh; of tlw 
('Olllhination Operations. :\o alJpli('ation for n•dncP<l 
rnh·s \\·a:-: ])(>fm·<· 1!w Commission at the tirnP of tlw 
ll<'aring. Tlw onl,'I· shipper witness, ~fr .• Jones, was 
askPd ahont rates and proper objPetions WPre made 
(H. :)7) on tlw basis that applicant had not proposed a 
rah• change on Pither the intrastate haul over which 
tltP Co111mission has jurisdiction, nor thP intl>rstate tar-
i ff"s \\'hich al'<' controlh·d hy the I.C.C. ThesP objections 
\\-Pl'P o\·errnlf'd and i\f r. .Tones th('n testified as to the 
pr<•sPnt rates on molten sulphur and on acid. He further 
was JH'nnitt<>d to us<> an assumed rate based upon a 
1 wo-\\'ay haul to proch1ce the puqrnrted $fi8,500.00 saving. 
ll<• said that if h<• <·onlCTn't get that saving he would 
llllt on his 0\\11 trn<'k. 
l\l r .• Tones tlwn askt•d wlwther or not he was "sup-
porting this application on the assumption that lower 
ratPs would bP available to you. That is right; we have 
found the st>rvi<·<• of hoth Prichard and Hatch very satis-
fodor~· to tlw rompan~· .... " (R. -1-:1) 
(<~wn after this state of the record, Hatch failed to 
Jll'PsPnt evidPTI<'<' as to its proposed n~clucPd rates - how 
1111wli - wlwn - what <'hange in interstatP - what 
1·l1:111g<' in intrastatP ~- etc. 
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The statute, Section 54-6-5 UCA 1953 relating to 
certification of common carriPrs requirPs first a finding: 
"from the evidence that public convenience and necessity 
require the proposed service. . . . " and then requires 
that it "take into consideration ... the existing trans-
portation facilities in the territory sought to be served. 
If the commission finds . . . that the granting of the 
certificate applied for will be detrirnrntal to the best 
interests of the people of the state of Utah, the Com-
mission shall not grant such certificate." 
Hatch seeks to obtain Prichard's acid haul by pro-
posing a lower rate. Consider that statute in light of 
the specific finding that Prichard's services "in the 
transportation of sulphuric acid are good." (R. 133) 
Also, consider the case law wherein this Court has on 
past similar issues interpreted the statute. 
We should keep in mind the initial "Report and 
Order Denying Application" (R. 107-110), in which the 
Commission specifically considered the only evidence 
before it, reviewed the suggested economies and then 
found that Hatch's position "has merit strictly on an 
economic and rate basis, but does not constitute a show-
ing of convenience and necessity or need for a new 
. " carrier. 
This was a rate case, with Hatch being unwilling to 
disclose its proposed nPw rates. ri1hP Commission could 
11 
not grant a certificate to a new carrier solely because 
it was suggested that the new carrier would "chisel" 
rates to get the business. The "n•hearing" was merelv 
an "Oral Argument on Petition for Rehearing." (R. 114) 
The new Report and OrdPr (R. 116-120) largely reiter-
ates the fonner findings which spell out the shipper's 
desire for lower rates which it believes will result. It 
then pursues the folJowing approach: "Pursuant to the 
Commission's order both Hatch and Prichard did 
attempt to work out some joint arrangement whereby 
these economies could be effected. 
"The carriPrs reported that they had attempted in 
good faith to ·work out a joint arrangement but had been 
unsuccessful in that attempt. The Commission's Order 
of July 12 was by its very nature a conditional order, 
basPd in part upon the ability of the carriers to effect 
the economies in a joint operation. "\Vhile the applicant 
IJatch provides satisfactory service on the southbound 
transportation of molten sulphur and the protestant 
Prichard provides satisfactory transportation on the 
northbound movement of sulphuric acid, there is no exist-
ing service available which can be performed by one 
carrier in the same vehicle which is necessary to effect 
the economies herein mentioned. 
"We stated in our original order that the case is 
more in the nature of a rate case than a certificate case 
mid that while the showing made by applicant was meri-
12 
torious it did not constitntP a showing of conveniencP 
and necessity. As a general proposition WP think thi:,, 
statement is coIT<>ct. H<nveY<'r, the facts 1uesented herp 
present a unique case in '''hieh we think e.onsideration 
of rates and economies proposed is proper. After hear-
ing arg11111ent by both applicant and protestant on appli-
cant's petition for rehearing and reeonsideration, and 
after hearing additional evidence adduced by both 
parties, \Ve find that applicant has sustained it.s lmrdPn 
of proving convenienee and npcessit_,, in this pnrtienlar 
instance, and that a gTant of tlw applieaton will afford 
the shipper a eombination transportation service at rate~. 
to which it is entitled." 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN REVERSING ITS 
ORDER OF JULY 12, 1966 WITHOUT NEW EVI-
DENCE AND IN GRANTING A CERTIFICATE TO 
HATCH. 
POINT VI 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ITS FINDING IN 
THE SECOND ORDER OF "HEARING ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY BOTH PARTIES," AS 
ONLY ARGUMENTS WERE HEARD ON AUGUST 
16, 1966. 
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POINT VII 
THE ORDER OF AUGUST 25, 1966 IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW AND IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS. 
Thf' Commission has been faced with a desire to 
help out a shipper on the one hand, and a complete failure 
of the applicant to prove public convenience and neces-
sity on the other hand. Its first Report and Order 
recognized this and properly denied the application. In 
an effort to be helpful, the Commission suggested that 
the applicant and protestant attempt to work out "every 
legal means of reducing operating costs and correspond-
ingly reduce the rates on the transporatation .... " Even 
the applicant, Hatch, thought this was wrong; see its 
petition for rehearing. (R. 112) 
The Commission then gave "Notice of Oral Argu-
ment'' on the said petition. At this time no reporter 
was required, as only oral argument was contemplated. 
A round-table type discussion was had, at which it be~ 
came evident that Hatch made it clear (as shown by 
its petition for rehearing) that it had no duty to lease 
its equipment to Prichard for the intrastate phase of the 
haul, though it admitted that it leased extra acid tank 
units from Prichard for some of its interstate operations. 
\Ve submit that the intransegent position of this large 
carrier presented a dilemma to the Commission which it 
sought to solve by surrendering to Hatch and taking 
awa~' Prichard's c:•stahlished acid haul. 
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Only one shipper appeared - only money savings 
by combining the interstate and intrastate movements 
in one carrier were at issue - how can this be considered 
proof of "public convenience and necessity"'? The Com-
mission had no jurisdiction over the interstate phase, 
either as to the authority or the rates, so it abdicated 
to the insistance of Hatch that the shipper might put on 
its O\Vll truck if the cheaper rates were not published 
by Hatch. In order to cut the rates, Hatch would have 
to take Prichard's acid haul away from it. 
rrhe record reflects that past operations have been 
on a rather modest basis, hut the shipper now contem-
plates an increase in its sulphuric acid manufacturing 
and use. vVhen it was tendering only a few loads per 
week, shipper was content to use the two carriers whose 
services is described as being "vpry satisfactory". Now 
it will have greater volume of movements, Atlas is de-
manding that only one carrier Rerve it and that the 
rates he draRtically cut. 
Historically, Prichard has held acid authority in 
bulk since the inception of the uranium boom. When the 
rail line was extended from Thompson to the Potash 
mine and molten sulphur was made available in tank 
cars there, Hatch sought and obtained interstate rights 
to haul such to Mexican Hat. Some virtue is claimed 
by Hatch in that it says that it proposed that it would 
not have opposed a similar application hy Prichard for 
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like interstate sulphur rights at that time if Prichard 
"·ould agree not to oppose Hatrh's application for intra-
state rights on the sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat 
to Moab (R. 63). The net result of this play by Hatch 
would have he·en that this large carrier ($2,936,849.00 
1965 revenue, R. 103) would be able to undercut Prichard 
and have the complete service to itself. When Prichard 
refused to surrender by acquiescing in this deal, Hatch 
has proceeded with the present application. 
Prichard testified as to its willingness to reduce 
its rates as and when the shipper increases its volume, 
hut such additional number of shipments have not been 
lPndered to it. Of course, this Commission has jurisdic-
ti on over intrastate rates and Prichard's present rates 
are approved by it. 
The new Report and Order giving Hatch its pro~ 
posed certificate was made by the Commission, revers-
ing its conclusions. Though it refers to a "further hear-
ing" (R. 116) and "additional evidence'' (R. 119) we 
have no record to sustain this. As indicated above, oral 
arguments were scheduled and in fact the parties, their 
counsel and the Commission had a sort of a "round table" 
discussion. Prichard was anxious to continue its service. 
No arrangements could be worked out with Hatch on 
Pquipment leases as the southbound sulphur was inter-
f'tatP and the acid µ:oing north was intrastate. 
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Section 54-7-15 U.C.A. 1953 relates to Rehearings. 
It provides in part that the "Commission may grant and 
hold such rehearing on such matters. . . ." What does 
"rehearing'' mean~ It must relate to the same type 
proceeding as was contemplated initially on an applica-
tion for an intrastate certificate which is designated 
in Section 54-6-5 as a "hearing," which contemplates 
proper notice and the takjng of evidence. A rehearing· 
must be a review of the portions of the case through 
new evidence. 
Thereafter Section 54-7-15 (supra) provides: 
"If, after such rehearing and consideration 
of all of the facts including those arising since 
the making of the order or decision, the commis-
sion shall be of the opinion that the original 
order or decision or any part thereof is in any 
respect unjust and unwarranfod or should be 
changed, the commission may abrogate, change or 
modify the same. Such order or decision shall 
have the same force and effect as an original 
order or decision, but shall not affect any right 
or the enforcement of any right arising from 
or by virtue of the original order or decision 
unless so ordered by the commission." 
No additional shipper evidence was taken at tlw 
purported "rehearing," which was noticed as an "oral 
argument." So in fact no rehearing was ever grantP<l. 
ri'his Court has imposed upon it the duty to revie1\' on 
certlorari in this proceeding the issue of ''whPther tlw 
17 
Commission has regularly pursued its authority .... " 
\Ve submit that the Commission had no right to reverse 
its prior findings of fact as to adequacy of service hy 
Prichard without further evidence and merely to accom-
modate a shipper's desire for lower rates. Further, the 
ultimate conclusion in the form of a finding in the new 
order (R 113) ... "that a grant of the application will 
afford the shipper a combination transportation service 
at rates to which it is entitled," is without any support-
ing evidence. The record contains absolutely no proof 
of a rate tender by applicant. "\Vhy is this one shipper 
"Pntitled" to such preferential rate treatment as to re-
quire the existing carrier, Prichard, whose rates have 
heen duly approved hy the Commission, to be deprived 
of its well established and needed acid haul 1 
It is not unusual for a shipper to support an appli-
cation of a new carrier in an effort to get lower rates. 
Traditionally the Commission has turned a deaf ear to 
such a plea and has followed the statutes in ascertaining 
the adequacy of existing transportation services. In this 
case the Commission seems to have been over persuaded 
to favor the Hatch application to accommodate a single 
shipper. 
vVe are mindful of the review proVJsrnns of the 
statute that: The findings and conclusions of the Com-
mission on questions of fact shall be final and shall 
not h0 suhject to n~vif>w. Such questions of fact shall 
18 
include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions 
of the Commission on reasonableness and discrimination. 
(Section 54-7-16 TT.C.A. 1953). The conclusions on 
"reasonableness and discrimination" relate to rate mat-
taers; thus the only real sanctity of the Co1mnission 's 
findings must be on "ultimate facts.'' The ultimate facts 
supported by evidence and found in this case are: 
(a) Prichard has proper authority to per-
form the acid haul; 
(b) Prichard 's serVJce and equipment are 
satisfactory; and 
(c) 'The shipper hopes for reduced rates if 
one carrier has both interstate sulphur authority 
and intrastate acid authority. 
The conclusion, that this constitutes proof of public 
convenience and necessity sufficient to take the business 
away from Prichard and hand it over to Hatch, is not 
given any sanctity by the statute. This is contrary to 
law; it violates prior administrative interpretations of 
the statute and is arbitrary and capricious. 
Many cases hold that this Court on review will not 
disturb the Commission's order if tlwre is any "sub~ 
stantial" or "competent" evidencP to support it. 
The purpose of the revie1v by the Court is to deter-
mine whetlwr the Commission ha:,; aetPd ontsidP of its 
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jurisdiction or in a manner which would properly be 
n•garded as capricious, arhitrar~· or wholly unreasonable 
in view of the record hefore it, Lakr Shore Motor Coach 
Li11es v. Wclli11g, 9 Utah 2d 11-1-; 3:39 P. 2d 1011. In that 
same case this court also said that; "the revenue pro-
vided for has a d0finite and useful purpose and that the 
duty and prerogative of the court are something more 
than a mere perfunctory rubber stamping of the actions 
of the Commission." 
We have the problem before this court now of de-
t0rmining whether the prospective savings in shipping 
costs for a single shipper constitutes the type evidence 
n'quired by the statutt• and prior cases to prove con-
Vl'nience and necessity. \Ve call to the court's attention 
the following quotation from Ashworth Transfer Co. v. 
PulJlic Service Commission of Utah, 2 Utah 2d 23; 268 
P. 2d 990, at 99:5: 
"The 'convenience' and 'necessity' to be con-
sidered is that of the public, Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d. 
209, and the statute does not require that the 
Commission find that the present facilities are 
entirely inadPquate. It merely requires that the 
Commission 'shall take into consideration ... the 
Pxisting transportation facilities'; it is obvious 
from the language of the order granting the 
application and the order denying the petition 
for rdwaring, as well as the evidence, that the 
Commission did take these matters into consider-
attion. '' 
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In a matter involving a request by carrier for a 
specialized service for a limited number of shippers 
(flour, sugar, powdered milk and salt for Pelton Spud-
nut, Inc. and two other shippers) the court vacated the 
order of the Commission, granted a certificate and said 
this: 
"It is well settled that this court cannot sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the Commission 
and its findings will not he disturbed wlwn thev 
are supported by competent evidence. · 
"The Commission must take into account the 
long-range plans for the protection of existing 
carriers, as well as the irmnediate convenience of 
certain members of the public. Common carriers 
which are expected to maintain regular servief> 
for the movement of freight in whatever quanti-
ties offered to and from all points on specified 
routes cannot operate economically and efficiently 
if other carriers are permitted to invade sueh 
routes for the sole purpose of handling special 
commodities on an irregular route basis." (Milne 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission 
of Utah, 11 Utah 2d 365; 339 P. 2d 909, at 910) 
It appears abvious that there was no proof of public 
convenience and necessity sufficient to sustain a grant 
of a certificate in this case, when only one shipper 
appeared, on only one commodity, and acknowle<lged ade-
quacy of the existing service by supporting the applica-
tion in hopes of a reduced combination tariff for intra 
state and interstate rnovenwntR. 
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POINT VIII 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING PRICH-
ARD'S PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
POINT IX 
THE GRANTING OF THE CERTIFICATE TO 
HATCH WILL RESULT IN A WRONGFUL DIVER-
SION OF TRAFFIC FROM PRICHARD, WILL AD-
VERSELY AFFECT ITS ABILITY TO SERVE THE 
AREA AND IS DERIMENT AL TO THE BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
After the oral argument and the new order of the 
Commission completely reversing its prior position, 
Prichard filed its petition for rehearing in this matter, 
pointing out the inadequacy of the evidence, the fallacy 
of taking away the service from an established carrier 
merely on a reduced rate promise of the applicant and 
the adverse effects which such would have upon the 
nhility of Prichard to continue its service. This was 
<lenied without oral argument but summarily by the 
Commission. Tht>re seems to be no finding by the Com-
mission at any point as to the adverse effect of the 
grant of this authority to Hatch, though such is one 
of the matters which the Commission should consider 
and tfotermint>. The evidt>nee shows that Prichard's pri-
rnary place of lmsin<>ss is at PricP, Ftah, hut that it haf.: 
stationed <•quiprnt>nt at M oah and that the taking a\ra\· 
of the only regular serviee \\'hieh it has from its l\f oab 
dispatch point, nanwl.v tlw aeid Jiau! from ~lexiean Hat 
to .Moab, will eliminate an:· Pconmnic basis for continu-
ing the stationing of equipnwnt at l\Ioah. Thus this 
community \\-ill have On<.' lPss motor cani<•r s<•rvi<'P avail-
able, one less group of Prnplo:·eps in its eeon0111:·, and 
that in part is proof of the detrimental c-ffrct upon the 
economy. The volume of lmsiness is not sufficient to 
sustain bx.·o earriers in transporting acid from tlw 1>lant 
at l\Texican Hat to the uranium plant at 1\1oah, but thr 
pffpd of thiR order will he to leavi> Prichard with the 
anthorit:r for all of 8an .Tuan and Grand CountieR and 
leave it with the obligation to serve the oecasional mow-
11wnts from Mexican Hat to small uranium mines in thr 
counties without the sustaining stn•ngth of the regular 
movPrnPnt of aeid to tlH' nraniu111 plant at l\f oah. 
lt was made very clear that Prichard would do all 
in its power to reduce its rates, with the approval of 
the Commission, if tlw additional volnnw of shipm0nt:-: 
were tendPred to it for shipmr·nt. Ruch volume rnovr-
ments wen~ the basis for the computation of anticipated 
savings by th<> ship1wr, should Hakh haw tlw two-way 
lllOVPmPnt. 
\Ve know that this eonrt ha:-; had lH'forP it ~ttl'fici<·nl 
rnattPrn from tl1P Puhli<' N'•rvic<• Co111n1i~~io11 to n·<·oµ;-
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nrne that, with rare exceptions, most transportation on 
helialf of a shipper is a one-way movement, and that the 
rates of carriers are established upon that basis. Whether 
it is the movement of asphalt from a refinpry to a road 
construction job, the transr)()rtation of beams or lumber 
to a construction sitP, the movPment of flour, salt or 
sngar to a bakery or canning establishmPnt, or the trans-
1iortation of household goods to a new residential loca-
t;on, no hackhaul is rxpected h.\· the carrier and none 
i::: available. I1~vPn the regular ronte motor common 
carriPrs rarely haw a halancPd operation whereby they 
<'an develop enough traffie originating at a point such 
as l\f oah or Kanab eoming back to the \Vasatch front 
to match the forward movemPnt of traffic from the Wa-
satch front area to thPse outlying points. Thus the 
gratuitous declaration hy the Commission in its second 
report and ordPr, that the removal of the transportation 
from Prichard and the granting to Hatch will afford the 
sliiv1wrs "combination transportation service at rates 
to which it is Pntitled" is pure fiction. No shipper, 
whether its nanw is Atlas or otherwise, is entitled to 
1-;1weial rat(•s on a combination interstat!:' or intrastate 
~-shipment, and no shipper is !:'ntitled to special rates 
Pn dissimilar com1110diti(•s, !:'Ven where both movements 
an• in intrastate conmwrce. The fact that the tonnage of 
aeid moving north to the uranium plant is substantially 
gr<·atPr than movPnient of sulphur from the railhead 
!!11ing south h.\' it:-;plf negativt•s the premise that the 
: 11 i pprq· is "entitled''' to a special rate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prichard respPctfully snhmits to tlw court that thi:s 
case requires th(~ reversal of th<' Public Sf'rvice Com-
mission of Utah, and the original rqwrt and order of 
the Commission denying- tht> application of Hatch should 
he affirm<~d and the new order reversed. Th0 fallacious 
premise of giving a hig shipper some savings at the ex-
pens~~ and destruction of a small motor carrier whosP 
rates are regulated by the Commission d()('S not sustain 
an award of a certificate of convenienc0 arnl neeessity. 
RPspectfull~1 submitted, 
HARRY D. PPGRLI1~Y 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Prichard Transf Pr, lnr. 
600 El Paso Gas Building 
Ralt LakP City, Utah 
